Saturday, January 30, 2010
Detroit: Glory to Disaster
CRASH COURSE: The American Automobile Industry's Road from Glory to Disaster
Reviewed by Jonathan Yardley
Paul Ingrassia of the Wall Street Journal, who covered the American auto industry for a quarter-century and probably knows it as well as any journalist, begins this account of its spectacular collapse by describing something called the "Jobs Bank." No, I'd never heard of it either. It was established by the manufacturers and the United Auto Workers in the 1980s "to provide temporary security for hourly workers on layoff," but "by the 1990s laid-off workers could remain 'bankers,' as they were nicknamed with knowing irony, for an unlimited time, making 95 percent of their wages while not working." This in turn led to "inverse layoffs," wherein "senior workers volunteered to be laid off and thus bumped junior workers back onto the assembly line."
Ingrassia asks: "After all, why should a worker with high seniority slave away building cars when workers with lower seniority collected virtually full pay just for sitting around? Such was the logic of Detroit's dysfunction." Indeed, "dysfunction" barely begins to cover it. "Self-destructiveness" or "insanity" would come a lot closer. Yes, by the time the feds finally forced General Motors and Chrysler into bankruptcy last year, most sentient Americans doubtless were aware that the domestic auto business was a mess, but in order to understand just how much of a mess it was -- not to mention how it got that way and how, if at all, it can be cleaned up -- you really need to read "Crash Course." Ingrassia is not the most gracious prose stylist on the planet, and his efforts to weave in the stories of a car dealer in Maine and father-and-son auto workers in Illinois tend to get lost in the bigger picture. But this is a vivid and wholly persuasive depiction of what can happen when "confrontation instead of cooperation" between labor and management becomes the "default mode" of operation.
"Hubris and sclerosis had been building for years in Detroit," Ingrassia writes, "in a heedless union and feckless managements." This isn't a story about good guys on one side and bad guys on the other, because for decades there was more than enough badness on both sides -- arrogance, incompetence, tunnel vision, irresponsibility, selfishness -- to satisfy even the most morbid screenwriter or novelist's desires. Along the way the occasional good guy makes a cameo appearance -- William Clay Ford Jr. and Alan Mulally, the man he hired to rescue the family business, being the most notable of recent vintage -- but this is such a rare occurrence you almost want to stand up and cheer.
Paul Ingrassia
Random House
ISBN 978-1-4000-6863-0
306 pages
$26
Random House
ISBN 978-1-4000-6863-0
306 pages
$26
Reviewed by Jonathan Yardley
Paul Ingrassia of the Wall Street Journal, who covered the American auto industry for a quarter-century and probably knows it as well as any journalist, begins this account of its spectacular collapse by describing something called the "Jobs Bank." No, I'd never heard of it either. It was established by the manufacturers and the United Auto Workers in the 1980s "to provide temporary security for hourly workers on layoff," but "by the 1990s laid-off workers could remain 'bankers,' as they were nicknamed with knowing irony, for an unlimited time, making 95 percent of their wages while not working." This in turn led to "inverse layoffs," wherein "senior workers volunteered to be laid off and thus bumped junior workers back onto the assembly line."
Ingrassia asks: "After all, why should a worker with high seniority slave away building cars when workers with lower seniority collected virtually full pay just for sitting around? Such was the logic of Detroit's dysfunction." Indeed, "dysfunction" barely begins to cover it. "Self-destructiveness" or "insanity" would come a lot closer. Yes, by the time the feds finally forced General Motors and Chrysler into bankruptcy last year, most sentient Americans doubtless were aware that the domestic auto business was a mess, but in order to understand just how much of a mess it was -- not to mention how it got that way and how, if at all, it can be cleaned up -- you really need to read "Crash Course." Ingrassia is not the most gracious prose stylist on the planet, and his efforts to weave in the stories of a car dealer in Maine and father-and-son auto workers in Illinois tend to get lost in the bigger picture. But this is a vivid and wholly persuasive depiction of what can happen when "confrontation instead of cooperation" between labor and management becomes the "default mode" of operation.
"Hubris and sclerosis had been building for years in Detroit," Ingrassia writes, "in a heedless union and feckless managements." This isn't a story about good guys on one side and bad guys on the other, because for decades there was more than enough badness on both sides -- arrogance, incompetence, tunnel vision, irresponsibility, selfishness -- to satisfy even the most morbid screenwriter or novelist's desires. Along the way the occasional good guy makes a cameo appearance -- William Clay Ford Jr. and Alan Mulally, the man he hired to rescue the family business, being the most notable of recent vintage -- but this is such a rare occurrence you almost want to stand up and cheer.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Tech Story :)
I called Dell once upon a time to get a warranty replacement for a power supply that had gone up in smoke. My company has a support agreement with them and is supposed to receive priority support from Americans. Somehow I wound up in the queue talking to the morons from New Delhi. That went something like this:Heavy Indian Accent: Thank you so much for calling Dell, my name is "Bob" (yeah, I bet it is buddy....), how many I assist you?
Me: *sigh* (well, might as well give it a shot) "Yeah, I have a bad power supply here and I need to get a replacement for it."
Tech Guy: Yes, yes, I am understanding that you have a bad power supply. Please insert the system diagnostics CD into the CD-ROM drive.
Me: I can't do that. When I plug the system in sparks come out of the back.
Tech Guy: Yes, yes, I am understanding your problem, please insert the system diagnostics CD into the CD-ROM drive.
Me: No, you don't understand, I can't plug the system in, the power supply failed.
Tech Guy: Please insert the system diagnostics CD into the CD-ROM drive.
Me: (trying different tack) I can't get the CD-ROM drive to open.
Tech Guy: Yes, I understand, is the computer plugged into the wall outlet?
Me: (back to square one) No, sparks will come out of it.
Tech Guy: Please insert the system diagnostics CD into the CD-ROM drive.
Me: *click*So I call them back and go through the same exact menu system. Somehow I wind up with an American this time. He had the thickest Texan drawl that I've ever heard in my life.Tech Guy: Thanks for calling Dell, my name is John, how may I help you?
Me: John, are you in the United States?
John: No sir! I'm in Texas.
http://science.slashdot.org/story/09/12/21/1748220/Virtual-Visits-To-Doctors-Spreading?art_pos=3
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Cap-And-Trade unsound
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/cap-and-trade-three-card-monte-dead-for.html
The latest embarrassment arrives via the peer-reviewed journal Science,
not known for its right-wing inclinations. A new paper calls attention
to what the authors (led by Princeton's Tim Searchinger) call "a
critical accounting error" in the way carbon emissions from biofuels
are measured in climate-change programs world-wide.
The Science
study argues [the Cap-and-trade program] is a false economy, because it
doesn't consider changes in land use. If mature forests are cleared to
make room for biofuel-growing farms, then the carbon that would
otherwise accumulate in those forests ought to be counted on ethanol's
balance sheet as well.
Cap-and-trade programs exacerbate the
problem because developed countries (where emissions are putatively
capped) get credit for reductions from ethanol—despite the fact that
their biofuels are generally grown in developing countries (where
emissions aren't capped). So if Malaysians burn down a rain forest to
grow palm oil that ends up in German biodiesel, Malaysia doesn't count
the land-use emissions and Germany doesn't count the tail-pipe
emissions.
By way of a
solution, Mr. Searchinger and his coauthors modestly suggest doing away
with the regulatory three-card monte and counting net ethanol emissions
from where they are actually emitted. But this is political heresy on
Rep. Henry Waxman's Energy and Commerce Committee, which passed its own
cap-and-tax program in July with the votes of farm-state Democrats,
because the bill all but banned the Environmental Protection Agency
from studying land-use changes. So much for letting "the science" guide
public policy.
The latest embarrassment arrives via the peer-reviewed journal Science,
not known for its right-wing inclinations. A new paper calls attention
to what the authors (led by Princeton's Tim Searchinger) call "a
critical accounting error" in the way carbon emissions from biofuels
are measured in climate-change programs world-wide.
The Science
study argues [the Cap-and-trade program] is a false economy, because it
doesn't consider changes in land use. If mature forests are cleared to
make room for biofuel-growing farms, then the carbon that would
otherwise accumulate in those forests ought to be counted on ethanol's
balance sheet as well.
Cap-and-trade programs exacerbate the
problem because developed countries (where emissions are putatively
capped) get credit for reductions from ethanol—despite the fact that
their biofuels are generally grown in developing countries (where
emissions aren't capped). So if Malaysians burn down a rain forest to
grow palm oil that ends up in German biodiesel, Malaysia doesn't count
the land-use emissions and Germany doesn't count the tail-pipe
emissions.
By way of a
solution, Mr. Searchinger and his coauthors modestly suggest doing away
with the regulatory three-card monte and counting net ethanol emissions
from where they are actually emitted. But this is political heresy on
Rep. Henry Waxman's Energy and Commerce Committee, which passed its own
cap-and-tax program in July with the votes of farm-state Democrats,
because the bill all but banned the Environmental Protection Agency
from studying land-use changes. So much for letting "the science" guide
public policy.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Friday, January 15, 2010
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Monday, January 11, 2010
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Saturday, January 09, 2010
Who is your competition?
Excerpt from http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/blog/wise-investing/results-depend-on-the-level-of-competition/1092/ ----
By Larry Swedroe
Roger Federer is the greatest tennis player of his era, and perhaps the greatest ever. .....
What is important to understand is that Federer’s competition is other individual players. In terms of individual skills:
* Andy Roddick has a better serve
* Andy Murray has a better backhand
* Fernando Gonzalez has a better forehand
* Rafael Nadal has a better baseline game, is a better conditioned athlete and is a superior player on clay
* Radek Stepanek has a better net game
* David Ferrer is faster
Yet, Federer is the better player. However, the world of investing presents a different situation.
While the competition for Federer is other individual players, the competition for investment managers is the entire market. It would be as if Federer always faced an opponent with Roddick’s serve, Nadal’s baseline game, etc. If that had been the case, Federer would not have produced the same results.
It’s important to understand that the results of any game are more dependent on the skill of the competition than on the skill of the individual competing. In the investment world, the competition is tough. Since as much as 80 to 90 percent of the trading is done by institutional investors, it’s difficult to think of a large enough group of victims to exploit.
By Larry Swedroe
Roger Federer is the greatest tennis player of his era, and perhaps the greatest ever. .....
What is important to understand is that Federer’s competition is other individual players. In terms of individual skills:
* Andy Roddick has a better serve
* Andy Murray has a better backhand
* Fernando Gonzalez has a better forehand
* Rafael Nadal has a better baseline game, is a better conditioned athlete and is a superior player on clay
* Radek Stepanek has a better net game
* David Ferrer is faster
Yet, Federer is the better player. However, the world of investing presents a different situation.
While the competition for Federer is other individual players, the competition for investment managers is the entire market. It would be as if Federer always faced an opponent with Roddick’s serve, Nadal’s baseline game, etc. If that had been the case, Federer would not have produced the same results.
It’s important to understand that the results of any game are more dependent on the skill of the competition than on the skill of the individual competing. In the investment world, the competition is tough. Since as much as 80 to 90 percent of the trading is done by institutional investors, it’s difficult to think of a large enough group of victims to exploit.
Friday, January 08, 2010
Thursday, January 07, 2010
Wednesday, January 06, 2010
Tuesday, January 05, 2010
Monday, January 04, 2010
Sunday, January 03, 2010
Saturday, January 02, 2010
Friday, January 01, 2010
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